Brent Foutz, Aleta Taylor, Drew Chamberlain, Michael Ann Rippen, Jordan River Nature Center, Inc., and Friends of Midas Creek, Inc. Appellant, vs. City of South Jordan, a body politic, and City of South Jordan Community Development Department : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Brent Foutz, Aleta Taylor, Drew Chamberlain,
Michael Ann Rippen, Jordan River Nature Center,
Inc., and Friends of Midas Creek, Inc. Appellant, vs.
City of South Jordan, a body politic, and City of
South Jordan Community Development
Department : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Robert C. Keller; Williams & Hunt; W. Paul Thompson; South Jordan City
Attorney; Melanie M. Serassio; Deputy South Jordan City Attorney; Attorneys for Appellees.
Jeffrey W. Appel; Jennifer L. Crane; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Foutz v. South Jordan, No. 20020642 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3908
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT FOUTZ, ALETA TAYLOR, 
DREW CHAMBERLAIN, MICHAEL 
ANN RIPPEN, JORDAN RIVER 
NATURE CENTER, INC., AND 
FRIENDS OF MIDAS CREEK, INC. 
Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, a body 




REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appellate Court Case No. 20020642 SC 
Civil No. 010908778 
JODY K. BURNETT 
ROBERT C. KELLER 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
W. PAUL THOMPSON 
South Jordan City Attorney 
MELANIE M. SERASSIO 
Deputy South Jordan City Attorney 
11175 South Redwood Road 
SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84095 
Attorneys for Appellees 
JEFFREY W. APPEL 
JENNIFER L. CRANE 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MAR 3 1 20G3 
U L f c R K 0 F
 THE COURT 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT FOUTZ, ALETA TAYLOR, 
DREW CHAMBERLAIN, MICHAEL 
ANN RIPPEN, JORDAN RIVER 
NATURE CENTER, INC., AND 
FRIENDS OF MIDAS CREEK, INC. 
Appellant, 
v. 
CITY OF SOUTH JORDAN, a body 




REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appellate Court Case No. 20020642 SC 
Civil No. 010908778 
JODY K. BURNETT 
ROBERT C. KELLER 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
W. PAUL THOMPSON 
South Jordan City Attorney 
MELANIE M. SERASSIO 
Deputy South Jordan City Attorney 
11175 South Redwood Road 
SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84095 
Attorneys for Appellees 
JEFFREY W. APPEL 
JENNIFER L. CRANE 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-0385 
Attorneys for Appellants 
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties are listed in the caption of the case. Plaintiffs/Appellants ("Plaintiffs") 
refer to Defendant/Appellee South Jordan City herein as the "City". 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Seek Enforcement of the City's Ordinances Pursuant 
to 10-9-1002 
This Court has established that an action brought by a landowner to request 
enforcement of a municipality's ordinances is an "enforcement" action pursuant to 10-9-
1002 ("Section 1002"), which is not subject to the thirty (30) day limitation set forth in 
10-9-1001 ("Section 1001"). Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake 
County, 2001 UT 108, 44 R3d 642, 652 ("Culbertson") (2001); Toone v. Weber County, 
2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079, 1081-82 (2002)("Toone"). 
To avoid the effect of this principle of law, the City has mischaracterized the 
nature of Plaintiffs' case as a challenge to the process for approval of the underlying Site 
Plan for the property at issue. However, the record demonstrates this is an action seeking 
to compel the City of South Jordan (the "City") to comply with its mandatory ordinances, 
and is therefore an "enforcement" action brought pursuant to Section 1002. See 
Culbertson, ffi[ 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652; Toone, ffif 7-10, 57 P.3d at 1081-82. 
Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed construction and use of the property at issue 
(the "Property") violated city ordinances, and, because of that illegal action, the City was 
required to issue a written stop order and prohibit issuance of a certificate of occupancy 
until such time as the Property was brought into compliance with city ordinances. (R 6-
8). Those claims were based on Ordinance 97-7's mandate that all property located 
within the 100-year flood plain must be preserved for open space, recreation, and 
preservation uses. (R 113, See Exhibit "xV in the Addendum to the Brief of Appellants). 
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When this action was filed, the developers were constructing an illegal 350-stall, concrete 
parking lot designed to serve a three-story office building on the Property, which was 
located almost entirely within the 100-year flood plain. (R 13, 65). Plaintiffs filed this 
action seeking enforcement of Ordinance 97-7 and other city ordinances set forth below. 
(R 3-8), Plaintiffs claims therefore fell within the purview of Section 1002, and were not 
subject to Section 1001's limitations. 
The City also has asserted the novel argument that Plaintiffs "enforcement 
action" is, in fact, subject to Section 1001's limitations because it involves issues 
previously considered by the City. (Brief of South Jordan City Defendants/Appellees, 
("City's Brief5) 9-16) As an initial matter, this argument fails because the City 
introduced no evidence before the District Court to support their allegations that the 
effect of Ordinance 97-7 was considered in the Site Plan approval process. Even if such 
evidence were introduced, such a holding would be directly contrary this Court's 
definition of "enforcement" actions, and would impose a vague qualifier that would 
render Section 1002 a nullity. As explained in further detail below, the City's arguments 
are factually and legally without merit. 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims Sought Enforcement of the Citv's Mandatorv 
_2 . a v 
Ordinances 
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking an Order from the District Court requiring the 
City to enforce its ordinances. The ordinances at issue are mandatory, not discretionary. 
(See Brief of Appellants ("Plaintiffs' Brier), 9-11, 30-32). The underlying factual basis 
for Plaintiffs' claims was that the use of the Property violated Ordinance 97-7 because it 
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allowed construction of the parking lot almost entirely within the boundaries of the 100-
year flood plain, which Ordinance 97-7 directed must be preserved as "open space/' (R 
3-8). Under the City's own definition, a parking lot is not "open space". (See Plaintiffs' 
Brief, 30-31; R 254-55). 
When Plaintiffs discovered this violation, they immediately requested the City 
issue a written stop order, as required by Section 12.16.040 of the City Code. (R 5-8, 
107, 320 (11-12)). When the City refused, the Plaintiffs requested the City convene its 
Board of Adjustment to hear this dispute. (R 6, 78). The City refused to convene the 
Board, and Plaintiffs filed this action seeking enforcement of the City's ordinances. (R 3-
9, 104). It is toward the City's enforcement failures that Plaintiffs' claims are directed. 
Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed: 1) Construction of the Site Plan violated 
Section 11.04.130 of the City Code, which requires that site plans, construction and 
infrastructure be constructed in conformance with City ordinances (R 7); 2) The City's 
failure to issue a written stop order to halt construction of the Site Plan violated Section 
12.16.040 of the City Code (R 7); and 3) The City's impending issuance of a certificate 
of occupancy would violate Section 12.04.170 of the City Code (R 7-8). (The relevant 
provisions of the City Code are attached to the Addendum to Plaintiffs' Brief as Exhibit 
"C'\) Accordingly, Plaintiffs sought "enforcement of decisions made pursuant to [the 
Land Use Act], i.e., zoning ordinance[s]", making this action an "enforcement" action 
properly filed pursuant to Section 1002. Culbertson, Iffl 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652. 
Section 1002 permits Plaintiffs "to seek enforcement of ordinances made pursuant 
to the Act directly in district court without [complying with Section 1001's limitations]." 
M:J S e e a l s o Toone, ^ 8-10, 57 P.3d at 1082 (Noting Section 1002 provides landowners 
with a '''right to institute actions based on 'violations' of the Land use Act and, tellingly, 
does not contain a thirty-day limitation on such actions.") Additionally, under Utah's 
liberal notice pleading standards, Plaintiffs' causes of action also include their claim that 
Defendants' issuance of the building permit for the project violated the Municipality 
Land Use Act ("Land Use Act"). See Jackson v. Joyner, 12 Utah 2d 410, 413, 367 P.2d 
452, 454 (1961) (Holding plaintiffs stated a cause of action though they did not plead the 
contents of statutes upon which they based their claim, because "all that is required in a 
complaint is that it clearly affords fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted 
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."); Williams v. State Farm 
Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (Noting Utah's liberal pleading rules are 
designed to afford parties "the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute."). These claims are not subject to Section 1001's 
thirty (30) day limitation. Culbertson, Iffl 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652; Toone, ffi| 8-10, 57 P.3d 
at 1082. 
Plaintiffs' challenge was not, as the City asserts, a "collateral attack" on the Site 
Plan approval process. (City's Brief, 8). Although Plaintiffs challenge involved factual 
and legal issues that should have caused the City not to approve the Site Plan, there was 
no evidence in the City's documents that indicated the City had ever considered the effect 
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of Ordinance 97-7 in the context of the Site Plan approval1. Rather, for the first time 
before the District Court, the City asserted that the 100-year flood plain shown on the Site 
Plan was actually the 500-year flood plain2. (R 207-08, 219-20). The City also argued 
the 350-stall, concrete parking lot met the definition of "open space", but failed to cite 
any evidence in the proceedings before the planning commission or city council that 
would justify such a conclusion. (R 212-13, 320 (13-16)). If this issue had been 
considered by the City in the Site Plan approval process, the City's records would have 
revealed some sort of discussion regarding whether the parking lot fell within the 
definition of "open space," and the City could have pointed the Court to those parts of the 
record during the argument below. The City's failure to do so supports the conclusion 
that Ordinance 97-7 was never considered by the City in its approval of the Site Plan. 
Plaintiffs claims also raise legal issues that are separate and distinct from those 
that the record indicates were considered in the Site Plan approval process. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs' Complaint requires the District Court to consider whether the City Code 
required the City to issue a written stop order and prohibit issuance of a certificate of 
1
 The only document relied upon by the City in support of their argument is the Site Plan 
approval itself, which did not evidence any consideration of Ordinance 97-7, the 
definition of "open space", or any consideration of restricted uses in the 100-year flood 
plain. (R 204-13). 
2
 The Plaintiffs objected to this argument as being wholly without foundation since the 
City introduced no evidence in support of their argument that the line clearly designated 
as the 100-year flood plain on the City's own documents was, in fact, the 500-year flood 
plain (R 226-32). To the contrary, the only evidence before the District Court 
established that the 100-year flood plain marked on the Site Plan map was, in fact, a 
correct depiction of the 100-year flood plan as defined on the governing documents. (R 
262-83). 
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occupancy until such time as the Site Plan was brought into compliance with Ordinance 
97-7. (R 3-8). There is no evidence in the record to suggest these issues were previously 
considered by the City. 
Rather than considering Plaintiffs' challenge, the District Court dismissed this 
case for the sole reason that Plaintiffs filed this action more than thirty (30) days after the 
Site Plan was approved. (R 299-304). The District Court held that Section 1001 applied, 
and neither Section 1002 nor City Code 12.04.090 (making violations of the Code 
continuing for each day they exist) "negate[d] the application" of Section 1001 \ (R 300, 
303-04). In so doing, the District Court failed to recognize the critical distinction 
between Sections 1001 and 1002, and failed to accurately characterize Plaintiffs' action 
as an "enforcement" action, rather than a challenge to the Site Plan approval process. 
B. Controlling Caselaw does not Support Appellee's argument 
In an attempt to distinguish this case from controlling caselaw, the City has 
asserted the novel argument that Section 1001 applies to enforcement actions when they 
J
 It should be noted that the District Court did not, as the City alleges, hold "that under 
such circumstances where a municipality has actually made a land use 'decision' 
applying the requirements of its ordinances to the factual conditions which plaintiffs 
assert constitute violations, § 10-9-1002 does not provide an 'alternative' remedy that 
allows Plaintiffs to avoid the limitations imposed by § 10-9-1001." (City's Brief, 8). 
The District Court's decision did not hinge on "such circumstances" where the City had 
allegedly previously considered the "factual conditions" at issue. In the course of the 
briefing and hearing below, the City failed to cite any evidence to support its argument 
that the City considered Ordinance 97-7 in the Site Plan approval process. The only 
evidence before the District Court was the Site Plan map illustrating the parking lot 
within the 100-year flood plain. Thus, the District's Court decision was based only on a 
strict interpretation of Section 1001 's limitation period, and its finding that Section 1002 
and the City Code did not "negate" the application of Section 1001. (R 300, 303-04). 
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involve factual issues previously considered by the City. (City Brief, 9-15). This 
argument is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, there is no evidence in the 
record to suggest Ordinance 97-7 was ever considered in the Site Plan approval process, 
and, in any event, the issues involved in this case were never decided by the City. 
Second, controlling caselaw does not provide support for such a distinction. 
1. The Legal Issues before this Court have not been Considered by the 
City 
The City's argument that Section 1001 applies to this case is based on an 
erroneous interpretation of the facts. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that 
the City ever considered the effect of Ordinance 97-7 in the Site Plan approval process. 
The only evidence relied upon by the City is the Site Plan map illustrating the location of 
the parking lot within the 100-year flood plain. This evidence does not demonstrate that 
the City considered whether or not the parking lot was permissible in that location. 
Additionally, this case involves legal issues that were never considered by the 
City. The District Court must decide whether the use of the Property as a parking lot 
violates Ordinance 97-7, and whether the City is required to issue a written stop order and 
refrain from issuing a certificate of occupancy until such time as the construction and use 
of the property is brought into compliance with Ordinance 97-7. These issues require the 
District Court to interpret various provisions of the City Code that were not considered by 
the planning commission in the Site Plan approval process. 
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2. There is No Support for the City's Argument that 
^'Enforcement" Actions are Subject to Section lOQl's 
Limitations when they Concern Factual Issues Previously 
Considered by the City 
There is no support for the City's assertion that some enforcement actions are 
subject to Section 1001. It is well established that "enforcement actions" are not subject 
to Section 1001's limitations. See Culbertson, ffif 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652; Toone, Iffl 7-10, 
57 P.3d at 1081-82. As mentioned above, in the last two years, this Court has clarified 
that "enforcement actions" include claims to enforce a City's Ordinances, and to enforce 
the Land Use Act . Id. It has not, as the City implies, distinguished between enforcement 
actions that do involve factual issues previously considered by the City (which 1he City 
argues would be subject to Section 1001), and enforcement actions that do not involve 
factual issues previously considered by the City (which the City argues would not be 
subject to Section 1001). Such a distinction would lead to a "slippery slope" in which 
almost any enforcement action could be subject to Section 1001, because it could involve 
factual issues already considered by the City. 
Such a distinction is not supported by the case law on which the City relies. This 
Court's decision in Culbertson was not based on the recognition that the "enforcement" 
Most recently, this Court explained "land use decisions" include the regulation of land 
use through the enactment of ordinances and regulations, and through the granting of 
pemiits relating to zoning and subdivision. Toone, ^} 7-8, 57 P.3d at 1081. The Court 
included the following examples of "land use decisions": administering provisions of a 
zoning ordinance; recommending approval or denial of subdivision applications: 
enacting zoning ordinances; granting zoning variances; enacting subdivision ordinances; 
and approving subdivision applications. Id. A claim that the City is violating its 
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claims did not involve factual issues already considered by the County. (City's Brief, 10-
11) Rather, the Culbertson holding was based strictly on the type of action challenged^. 
Because the plaintiffs challenged the City's failure to wCenforce" their ordinances, this 
Court properly deemed it an "enforcement" action not subject to Section 1001's 
limitations. Culbertson, ffif 29-31, 44 P.3d at 652. Thus, this Court plainly established 
that actions seeking enforcement of local ordinances made pursuant to the Land Use Act 
are not subject to Section 1001's limitations. Importantly, this Court did not suggest or 
Ordinances by failing to issue a stop work order may not fairly be included within this 
definition of a "land use decision." 
5
 The City has argued that "[i]n Culbertson, the essence of the Plaintiffs' claims were that 
a developer was failing to comply with conditions imposed by the County" in its 
approval process, which claims raised issues that were independent of decisions already 
made by the County. (City's Brief, 10). The City has therefore attempted to distinguish 
this Court's holding in Culbertson on the grounds that Culbertson applied only to issues 
not previously addressed by the County. Contrary to the City's argument, the holding in 
Culbertson was not so limited. The plaintiffs' challenge did not, as the City implies, 
concern only a developer's failure to comply with County imposed conditions. Rather, 
the plaintiffs in Culbertson challenged construction of a building that encroached upon 
certain property, in violation of the County's ordinances. 44 P.3d at 647. Those facts 
are conspicuously in accord with the facts at issue in the instant case. In considering 
whether Section 1001 prevented the court from considering the plaintiffs' case (for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies), the Court gave a straightforward analysis of 
the distinction between challenges to land use decisions and enforcement actions. It 
explained that "[pjlaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made under the Land Use act, 
but instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it, i.e., zoning ordinance and 
the [conditional use permit]. Enforcement of the act and ordinances made pursuant to it 
is addressed in Section 1002." Id. at 652 (emphasis in original). Construing Section 
1002, the Court explained the plaintiffs "are permitted to seek enforcement of 
ordinances made pursuant to the Act directly in district court" without complying with 
Section 1001's limitations. Id. 
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imply that its holding applied only to those enforcement actions which involve factual 
issues not previously considered by local governments. 
Similarly, in Toone, this Court clarified that Section 100Ts thirty (30) day 
limitation does not apply "where a party seeks relief from a county's violation of the 
[Land Use Act] . . . .In such instances, a party may bring an action under the next 
following section, [Section 1002], which provides county land owners with the right to 
institute actions based on 'violations' of the Act and, tellingly, does not contain a thirty-
day limitation on such actions." Toone, *f 9, 57 P.3d at 1082. In that case as well, the 
Court did not state or imply that a party may only bring an action under Section 1002 if 
the "violations" complained of do not concern issues already considered by the County. 
The City's reliance on Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305, 392 
P.2d 40 (Utah 1964)("Lund"), Merrihew v. Salt Lake Planning & Zoning Comm'n., 659 
P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983)("Merrihew"), and Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp., 897 P.2d 
1232 (Utah App. 1995)("Bennion") in support of its argument is misplaced. Importantly, 
those cases were decided before Culbertson and Toone and therefore are superceded to 
the extent they conflict with the more recent decisions. Those cases are also 
distinguishable from the instant case because they concerned appeals of land use 
decisions or decisions administering the local ordinances, rather than a challenge to a 
City's failure to enforce its own ordinances. 
In Bennion, the plaintiff alleged that the County's approval of a plat violated the 
applicable zoning ordinances. 897 P.2d at 1233. The plaintiffs challenge was therefore 
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to a uland use decision," as opposed to a city's failure to enforce it's own ordinance. In 
Lund, the plaintiff tried to challenge approval of a building permit, also a "land use 
decision," months after it was issued without exhausting administrative remedies. 392 
P.2d at 42. In Merrihew, the plaintiff appealed a denial of a building pemiit. 659 P.2d at 
1067. Additionally, the Court's decisions in Lund and Merrihew were decided under a 
different statute, and therefore do not apply to this case6. 
C. Even if the City was Correct, and the Thirty (30) Day Limitation 
Applies to Plaintiffs9 Action, the City Code Makes the Violation at 
Issue a Continuing One, Thereby Extending the Thirty (30) Day 
Deadline 
Section 12.04.090 provides that a violation of the City Code "shall be deemed a 
separate offense for each day the violation exists." (R 141). Additionally, Section 
12.16.040 requires the City to issue a wiitten stop order whenever it finds construction or 
use of property to violate a City ordinance. (R 156). Thus, the City Code unambiguously 
directs that a violation of Ordinance 97-7 will be deemed a separate offense for each day 
it exists. The City's obligation to issue a written stop order therefore begins anew for 
each day the violation exists, and the City is without authority to disregard this 
mandatory duty. Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332, 337-38 
(1999)("Springville Citizens") (Holding City is without authority to derogate from the 
terms of its mandatory ordinances). 
6
 In the event this Court believes Plaintiffs should have attempted to appeal the City's 
failure to enforce its ordinances to the City's Board of Adjustment, it should be noted 
that Plaintiffs did, in fact, try to appeal the City's inaction to the Board, but the City 
refused to convene the Board of Adjustment. 
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If Section 1001 applies to this action, Plaintiffs' challenge was timely because it 
was within thirty days of the continuing violation of Ordinance 97-7, and the continuing 
failure of the City to issue a written stop order. It was also filed, Plaintiffs believe, before 
the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, and was therefore within the limitations 
period. 
II. This Court Should Direct the District Court to Grant Summary Judgment in 
Favor of Plaintiffs 
A. This Court May Consider Plaintiffs' Substantive Arguments 
The City argues that this Court should not consider Plaintiffs' arguments on the 
merits because the District Court did not reach such arguments in dismissing Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. (City's Brief, 16). The law is well-established that this Court may rule on 
any grounds before the District Court, even if it is one not relied upon below. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235, 240 (Utah 1993)(Addressing "a question not 
reached by the trial court."); Garson v. Garson, 105 A.D.2d 726, 730, 481 N.Y.S.2d 162, 
165 (1984)("On review of the denial of plaintiff s motion for summary judgment this 
court is empowered to search the record and may instead, if warranted, grant summary 
judgment to plaintiffs adversaries."). The City has attempted to distinguish that caselaw 
on grounds that this appeal seeks a reversal of the District Court "based on arguments 
that were moot below." (City's Brief, 17). This argument ignores the fact that the 
District Court's sole basis for holding Plaintiffs' case moot was the application of Section 
1001's thirty (30) day limitation to this enforcement action. (R 300. 303-04). Since this 
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holding was in error, it does not constitute sufficient grounds to refuse to consider 
Plaintiffs' claims. 
All of the facts raised in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment were before the District Court. (R 99-200, 204-15, 236-56, 
320 (3-19)). This Court may therefore consider those arguments and issue a ruling on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Garson 
v. Garson, 105 A.D.2d at 730, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 165. Furthermore, since Plaintiffs' appeal 
involves a strict interpretation of the City's ordinances, this Court is in as good a position 
as the District Court to render a ruling on the legality of the City's actions. See Toone, 
57 P.3d at 1081 ("The proper interpretation of a statute is . . . a question of law, which we 
review for correctness."); Springville Citizens, ^ 22, 979 P.2d at 336 (Utah 1999) ("In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not defer to the legal conclusions of the 
district court, but review them for correctness."); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 
P.2d 212, 218 (Utah 1992)("Sandy City") ("Because summary judgment is granted as a 
matter of law rather than fact, we are free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions.") Since this Court affords no deference to the District Court on pure issues 
of law, it need not wait for the District Court to issue its conclusions prior to considering 
the legal issues before it on this appeal. 
This Court is also well-equipped to rule on Plaintiffs' Motion since the City is not 
entitled to a presumption of validity in this appeal. The City relies on Section 1001 to 
argue that if this Court does consider Plaintiffs' challenge, it should presume the City's 
13 
decision to approve the parking lots in the 1 (30-year flood plain is valid. (City's Brief, 
17). However, as this Court has been apprised, the Plaintiffs have alleged the City's 
failure to enforce its ordinances is illegal. (See Plaintiffs' Brief, 30-32). Thus, the 
presumption afforded to "land use decisions" is not appropriate in this case. This Court is 
called upon to determine whether the City complied with its ordinances in failing to take 
appropriate enforcement action in response to a violation of Ordinance 97-7. The 
interpretation of Ordinance 97-7 and the City Code are pure questions of law. "The 
[City's] technical experience in planning and zoning is of no relevance in deciding these 
legal issues." Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 218. 
B. The City's Ordinances Prohibit the Location of a Parking Lot in the 
100-Year Flood Plain, and Required the City to Issue a Written Stop 
Order and Prohibit Issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy to prevent 
Construction and Use of the Parking Lot 
The City has argued that its ordinances may be read as allowing the parking lots 
within the 100-year floodplain, but has failed to rely upon any of its ordinances bearing 
on this issue. (City's Brief, 17). Significantly, the City has failed to rely upon its own 
definition of "open space" found in the City Code, or its definition set forth in Ordinance 
97-7. The City has instead relied upon the Master Development Agreement ("MDA"), a 
non-binding agreement between the City and the Developer. (City's Brief, 18: See R 
209). Though the Plaintiffs cited the MDA to clarify the permissible uses in the 
dedicated open space area, this Court must examine the ordinances themselves to 
determine whether the parking lot falls within the City's own definition of "'open space". 
See Springville Citizens, ^ 26-30, 979 P.2d at 337-38.. 
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As explained in detail in Plaintiffs' Brief, the parking lot at issue does not fall 
within the City's own definition of "open space" which is defined as "an area preserved 
from development of intense urban uses in a natural, landscaped or agrarian state for 
recreational or other public purposes." City Code, 12.08.360 (R 254-55; See Plaintiffs' 
Brief, 30-33). The parking lot does not fall within the plain meaning of "open space", 
"natural", "landscaped", or "agrarian." It is composed primarily of cement, and was 
designed and constructed to provide parking for an adjacent, three-story office building. 
(R 253-56). As Plaintiffs argued to the District Court, it is hard to imagine a use more 
intensely urban than a parking lot constructed to serve an urban office building. (Id.). A s 
a matter of law, the construction and use of the River Corridor area as a large parking lot 
does not constitute an "open space, recreation or preservation" type use for which the 
River Corridor was to be preserved, and is a direct violation of Ordinance 97-7. 
Plaintiffs also demonstrated to the trial court that the City's failure to issue a 
written stop order requiring the responsible party to cease all use of the Property as a 
parking lot was illegal. Section 12.16.040 of the City Code provides: "[if it comes to the 
City's] attention that any... construction,... use or contemplated use of land is in violation 
of the provisions of [the City's] Zoning Ordinance, [the City] shall issue a written stop 
order to the person responsible therefor, ordering and directing such person to cease and 
desist such construction, repair or use." (Emphasis added). (R 156). The use of the term 
"shall" indicates that issuance of a written stop order is mandatory. Springville Citizens, 
•111 30, 979 P.2d at 337-38. 
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Once the City discovered that the use of the Property was in violation of the City's 
Zoning Ordinance, it was not at liberty to allow construction of the parking lot 1o 
continue. Id. The City was required by law to issue a written stop order directing the 
responsible entity to cease and desist such construction and use. The City's refusal to 
issue a written stop order as required by the City Code, or take such other action as was 
necessary to bring the Site Plan into compliance with the Code, was therefore illegal as a 
matter of law. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court overturn 
the District Court's dismissal of this action, and grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £?]_ day of March, 2003 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Jeff iy W. jfipp&s 
/Jennifer L. Crane 
^Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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